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The first and main claim of this paper is that physics cannot provide, empirical evidence 
for the objectivity (mind-independence) of absolute becoming, for the simple reason that it 
must presuppose it, at least to the extent that a classical (i.e., non-quantum) spacetime theory 
presupposes a priori an ontology of events. However, the fact that a theory of absolute 
becoming must be situated in the abstract realm of metaphysics does not make becoming 
completely irrelevant for physics, since my second claim will consist in showing that 
relational becoming, once appropriately defined and understood, properly belongs to the 
tangled set of issues usually referred to with the label “the arrow of time”.  
The paper is divided into three parts. In the first I will strike a blow against the traditional, 
received views of becoming, typically requiring the unreality of the future as a necessary 
condition for the objectivity or mind-independence of temporal passage. After having severed 
the misleading link between the concept of becoming and the unfortunate debate between 
presentism and eternalism, in the second part I will offer a much needed, clear explication of 
becoming, given in terms of the simple occurrence of events. I will then defend this approach 
to becoming from foreseeable objections, especially concerning its faithfulness to the time of 
our experience. After having crucially distinguished between absolute and relational 
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becoming, in the third part I will bring spacetime physics to bear on the explication of 
becoming. In particular, I will show why the definability of a becoming relation in terms of 
the relation of past causal (or chronological) connectibility of Minkowski spacetime gives us 
no clue as to how we should use physics to establish the mind-independence of the former 
relation.  
 
§1 What becoming is not 
  
As is sometimes the case in philosophy, one way to solve a problem is to dissolve it, that 
is, to show that what had so far been considered a substantial debate is in fact not genuine at 
all. The debate I have in mind is between those who claim that the future and the past are as 
real as the present (the eternalists, or block-view theorists) and those holding that only the 
present, properly speaking, is real or exists (presentists). In part fueled by this debate – and 
often without having a clear idea of what becoming really meant or entailed – in the last few 
decades there have been various attempts to find out whether becoming, whatever that meant, 
was compatible with, or definable within, physical theories like the special or the general 
theory of relativity.  
Despite the confusions afflicting the literature, the prevailing idea seems to have been that 
becoming (or the flow of time) is connected to ontological issues, i.e., issues of the kind 
debated by presentists and eternalists. In particular, for quite some time, and by virtually all 
the authors engaged in the debate, the unreality of future events has been regarded as the 
main, necessary condition for an objective, ontological (non-merely subjective) becoming. 
This unreality is typically either mirrored by that of past events, as presentists have it, or 
contrasted with the reality of the past, as “empty view theorists” or “possibilists” have it (see 
Dorato 1995 and Savitt 2001).  
                                                                                                                                                        
1 I thank two anonymous referees for their precious comments to a previous version of this paper. 
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Quite significantly, despite their disagreement on how to interpret the ontology of 
Minkowski spacetime, Putnam (1967), Rietdijk (1966), Weingard (1972) and Stein (1991), 
just to name a few, seemed to presuppose that the crucial issue at stake in trying to 
understand whether the time of our experience conflicts with special relativistic time involved 
the issue of the ontological status of future events. So, while Putnam claimed that in virtue of 
the relativity of simultaneity the future in Minkowski spacetime had to be regarded as “real” 
and “definite” as the past and the present, according to Stein, given certain hypotheses, for 
any point P of Minkowski spacetime, the reality of becoming is equivalent to the claims that 
as of any event P, events in the past light cone of P are all “definite”, while the future light 
cone of P and the spacelike-related region contain only events that, as of P, are “indefinite”.2 
Note that, following Maxwell (1985, p. 24), by “definite” Stein means “ontologically fixed” 
(1991, p. 148) and in the present context the key word for me is “ontologically”.  
While for a more thorough attack on the meaningfulness of the debate between presentists 
and eternalists I refer the reader to Savitt (MS), and Dorato (2005), here it will suffice to 
remark that once we distinguish between a tensed and a tenseless sense of existence, there is 
no more room for disagreement between those who claim that only the present is real – and 
therefore can conceive, allegedly, that future events can become real in the present – and 
those that must deny that such a becoming can occur, since for them future, present and past 
events are equally real.  
DEF1 Tensed existence. Event e “exists” in the tensed sense of “existence” iff it exists now. 
This definition is to be contrasted with the following: 
                                                 
2 For the sake of precision, Putnam (1967) was more interested in claiming that special relativity entails the 
reality of the future than in using this conclusion to argue that becoming is incompatible with Minkowski 
spacetime. Stein (1991), on the other hand, did not defend becoming explicitly, but simply its compatibility with 
Minkowski spacetime. But they certainly disagreed about whether in Minkowski spacetime the future is to be 
regarded as real as the present and the past. 
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DEF2 Tenseless Existence For all present moments, event e “exists” in a tenseless sense of 
“existence” iff it has existed, exists in the present or will exists.3  
 
The utility of DEF2 is in its contrast with abstract existence: the difference between a set of 
desks (if it exists) and my desk is, respectively, the difference between a non-
spatiotemporally extended object and something that occupies some space and lasts for some 
time. I will now show why, on the minimal assumption that some event will occur after the 
present – i.e., that the world will not come to an end after now – presentism becomes either 
trivial or inconsistent, depending on whether the thesis of presentism is formulated by using a 
tensed or a tenseless sense of existence. Let us first explore the two alternatives defined 
above as if they were exhaustive. The possibility that there is a third sense of existence, 
existence simpliciter, put forth by Sider (2001 and 2004) and Crisp (2003, 2004) will not be 
discussed in full here, as I think it has already been rejected in my (2005).4  
Consider the typical claim that any future (past) event does not exist. In the previous 
sentence, the verb “exist” is either tensed or tenseless. In the former alternative, the presentist 
is claiming that future (past) events do not now exist, and this is a triviality to which any 
eternalist would subscribe. On the other hand, if the “exist” in the first sentence of the 
paragraph is tenseless (tertium non datur, on the current hypothesis), since events exist 
tenselessly just in case they either have a past, or a present, or a future existence, by denying 
that any future (past) event E tenselessly exist (as we are now supposing), the presentist is 
caught in a contradiction. Since, in virtue of DEF2, the fact that E will occur (or has occurred) 
means that it exists tenselessly, one cannot assert that E does not (tenselessly) exist because it 
is non-present. 
                                                 
3 In another oft-quoted formulation, e exists tenselessly iff it occupies, or is identical with, a point-like or finite 
region of spacetime, where the latter’s existence must presumably be independent of both tensed and tenseless 
existence. See below for difficulties of this formulation 
4 See also Ludlow (2004) 
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If the pendulum of presentism oscillates between peddling tautologies and contradictions, 
one may wonder what motivates its followers. My diagnosis is that presentism gains some 
credibility because eternalism has been saddled with absurdities that our definitions above 
avoid. Two of these absurdities are worth reporting. The first would make us believe that the 
claim that past, present and future events are equally real, or exist on a par, means that they 
are all simultaneous. However, “existing on a par” does not entail co-existing in a Totum 
Simul: events in a “block universe”, with which the eternalist metaphysics is often associated 
are, exactly as in the standard presentist’s metaphysics, temporally separated. No possible 
disagreement here!  
The second trap is easily stated: even though it is always true to assert that “F occurs at 
tF”,5 such an eternal truth about event F in no way implies the eternal existence of the event 
F. Also in this case, there cannot be any disagreement between those who claim that the 
future is real and those who claim that it is not. The distance between presentism and 
eternalism is made even closer by the remark that even though the relation “tenselessly co-
existing with” trivially coincides with the universal relation in any spacetime – namely with 
the relation linking any event e with any other event – each event, from its own spatio-
temporal “perspective”, exists, either tensedly or tenselessly, only when it occurs.  
In order to further deflate the metaphysical dispute I have been sketching, I think it is fair 
to recognize an important role to both senses of the word “existence” defined above. 
According to our different purposes, we rely on the tensed sense of existence, and then we 
take a perspectival attitude toward existence; some other times, for different purposes, we 
rely on a tenseless sense of existence, and we look at reality from “nowhen”. Both senses are 
well-grounded and useful. The main point, however, is one that Carnap made long ago: a 
                                                 
5 For the sake of the argument, we can forget relativistic complications raised by tF, to be handled below.  
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pragmatic difference of this kind commands only a linguistic choice, and should not be 
transformed into a difference about ontological commitments.  
This point also sidesteps an ingenuous arguments put forward by Sider (2004) with the 
intent of claiming that the disagreement between the presentist and the eternalist is genuine. 
Sider notes that translating “dinosaurs existed” with “it was the case that dinosaurs exist”  
(1)   P((∃x) (Dx))  
does not generate an existentially committing sentence for the presentist, unlike the 
eternalist’s “there exist dinosaurs and they are located before us” 
(2)   ((∃x) (Dx & Bxu)) 
which implies that “there exist dinosaurs”. Since in the present context I have to be brief, I 
will just note that the meaning of such an alleged, third, generalized sense of existence, given 
by the existential quantifier simpliciter, is going to depend on what our descriptive purposes 
are: the interpretation of the logical symbol ∃, which is what matters, will differ accordingly. 
While formula (1) clearly uses ∃ in a tensed sense, it is tenseless existence that is 
presupposed in (2). In any case, difference in logical form (granting that the first formula is 
not a quantified one) need not boil down to a difference in existential commitments, since 
both presentists and eternalists agree that “dinosaurs existed” and that “they do not exist 
now”. In conclusion, there is not a single sense of existence, over and above the tensed, the 
tenseless and the abstract sense, since one can always analyze this alleged generalized sense 







§2 What is, then, becoming? Absolute becoming and the happening of events 
 
If I am right in arguing that there cannot be any disagreement about any of the 
metaphysical claims stated above, it follows that becoming should not to be regarded as the 
becoming real, determinate, definite or fixed in the present of previously unreal, 
indeterminate, indefinite or unfixed events. This argument already gives evidence to a claim 
that is of paramount importance because it has been much too neglected in the past: if there is 
becoming, the asymmetry it imposes on the structure of time should not be cashed 
ontologically, that is, as involving the difference between the real and the unreal, but simply 
physically, in strict connection with the various asymmetries constituting the arrow of time6.  
In order to further defend this claim, in what follows I will introduce another distinction 
which also contributes to clarify in a decisive way some problems that in the past have been 
conflated, namely a distinction between absolute and relational becoming. It is in particular 
the latter notion that expresses what we intuitively mean by temporal becoming. 
DEF3 Absolute becoming. The claim that an event e “becomes” in an absolute sense (or 
“comes into existence”) at a certain time-place simply means that e occurs or happens at that 
time-place.7
DEF4 Relational becoming For any pair of events x and y belonging a spacetime S and a 
binary relation of becoming B, the claim that x and y are related by B (xBy) means that x has 
become as of y.  
Let me stress at the outset that relational becoming presupposes absolute becoming, a fact 
which will be of paramount importance for the main claim of this paper, and on which I will 
                                                 
6. For a recent survey on the arrow of time, see Albert (2001). Despite an insistence on the geometrical condition 
of temporal orientability, which in my opinion is necessary but not sufficient to the existence of a global arrow 
of time, this view of becoming is not unrelated to that advocated by Maudlin (2002). 
7 This view has been independently reformulated by both Dorato’s (2002) and Savitt’s (2002) contributions to 
Callender C. (ed.) Time, Reality and Experience. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, but originates in 
Broad (1938). Recently, also Dennis Dieks has independently come to defend it. 
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return below. The adjective “absolute” in DEF3 refers to the fact that here we are abstracting 
from the spatial and temporal relations that an event e bears to other events − relations that 
are crucial in DEF4 − so that we could have absolute becoming also in a universe with just 
one event. As soon as we have more than one event and we add spatiotemporal structure to 
the universe, we have relational (temporal and spatial) becoming, and the kind of structure we 
have is going to depend crucially on the kind of spacetime we are considering.  
DEF5 the temporal becoming of a pair (a set) of temporally separated events consists in the 
fact that such events occur successively, or at different instants of time. 
DEF6 the spatial becoming of a pair (a set) of spatially separated events consists in the fact 
that such events occur at different locations in space.  
Clearly, we can have different forms of relational becoming, depending on the constraints 
imposed by the various spacetime structures: temporal becoming can either be a complete 
order (as in Newtonian spacetime or in some highly symmetric models of general relativity), 
or a partial order (in the special theory of relativity). In Newtonian spacetime, spatial 
becoming is the relation of co-occurring at the same instant of absolute time, a relation that is 
made possible by the existence of an absolute relation of simultaneity. In the special theory of 
relativity, due to the relativity of simultaneity, temporal becoming is either frame-dependent 
and global, and therefore non-invariant or else, as we will see in §3, simply incompatible with 
spatial becoming. Consequently, if there is invariant temporal becoming in Minkowski 
spacetime, it must be strictly local (becoming along worldlines), and spatial becoming is 
ruled out, despite the fact that spatial becoming, were it real, would be invariant for all 
inertial frames, given that the relation of “being spacelike-related” is invariant.8 In the general 
theory of relativity, which here I will not discuss, the completeness of the order of temporal 
                                                 
8 Notice that, in light of the above section, the claim that if there is temporal becoming no two spacelike related 
events can have become one relative to the other should not be taken to mean that such events do not exist one 
relative to each other. 
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becoming might be reestablished by those cosmological models admitting a cosmic time 
function. Finally, following the previous distinctions, we should also distinguish a tensed 
form of becoming from a tenseless form. In the former case, an event e occurs or happens 
now or in the present; in the latter case, e occurs or happens at some time-place or at some 
point-region of spacetime 
I will now discuss four related points raised by my definition of absolute becoming and 
which concern: (a) the status of events in their relation to spacetime; (b) a defense of the 
plausibility of linking “becoming” and “happening”; (c) the possible contrast class of the 
definition, namely the sense in which we could claim that a physically possible universe 
could lack becoming altogether, something which will also help us to see the sense in which 
physics must presuppose absolute becoming; finally (d) the sense in which the proposed 
explication is faithful to the passage of time in our experience. Let me examine these four 
important points in turn. 
(a) 
DEF3 above regards physical events as the protagonists of becoming. Events, which in 
ordinary language metaphysics are entities with temporal parts, when sufficiently idealized or 
pointlike, are also the very building blocks of any spacetime theory, whether Newtonian or 
relativistic. The proposed definition of absolute becoming has rather interesting 
consequences: if physical events are what is denoted by the points of the mathematical 
manifold that is used to represent them, and if we can admit the occurrence of events in a 
certain space-time S, then we can talk about events becoming in S. Furthermore, it would 
seem that we have the legitimacy of such a talk, so to speak, for free, or a priori, since the 
ontology of any spacetime theory presupposes physical events. Absolute becoming is 
presupposed by physics and trying to use an empirical science to provide empirical evidence 
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for it simply amounts to putting the cart before the horse. However, is the definition 
acceptable? What kind of notion of event is it relying on?  
Luckily, it is not necessary to complicate the simplicity of DEF3 with complicated 
questions about the metaphysics of events. Certainly, it is an immediate consequence of the 
definition that there cannot be becoming where there are no events, so that it might seem that 
empty spacetime cannot be the locus of becoming. This conclusion, however, follows only 
from the thesis that events should not be identified with regions of spacetime; more precisely, 
within this context we should consider three different possibilities, among which there is no 
necessity of choosing. 
a1) If events just are, à la Quine (1986), regions of spacetime, then according to DEF3, 
becoming just is the coming into being of those regions. However, there is nothing absurd in 
this option, which would be very close to a form of spacetime substantivalism: after all, in 
contemporary cosmologies, “the expansion of the universe” is in some sense the expansion of 
spacetime itself, since galaxies clearly do not expand in a pre-existing spacetime.9 With the 
passage of cosmic time, the occurring of events would simply be identical with the coming 
into being or the addition to the previous spacetime of new regions.  
a2) If, on the contrary, events are to be distinguished from spacetime – which in this case 
could be regarded, à la Leibniz, as a set of spatiotemporal relations – then we can simply 
suppose that events are the physical primitives of our ontology, and we can understand them 
in terms of the typical textbooks examples: a sufficiently “small” region of an 
electromagnetic or a gravitational field10, an oscillating charge, a flash of light, a 
measurement result in quantum mechanics, and so on. In this option, we cannot have regions 
of the spacetime manifold where there are no physical events at all, i.e., regions in which 
                                                 
9 I owe this remark to Avshalom Elitzur, for which I thank him. 
10 In this case, fields are to be understood as entities definable independently of spacetime regions! 
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nothing changes or there is no becoming, since events exemplify spatiotemporal relations but 
are not in spacetime.  
a3) As a third possibility, it might be noted that if, against a1), it did not make sense to talk 
about spacetime itself as becoming and if events, as it is supposed in a2), were distinct from 
existing spatiotemporal regions, it would be too restrictive to limit the scope of becoming to 
non-empty regions of spacetime where there are events. However, consider that the metric 
field of general relativity is certainly not to be identified with empty spacetime, and therefore 
we should not worry too much about the “restriction” is question. For example, a hole of 
matter in a curved spacetime with a metric field defined on it can certainly have events in it, 
and therefore according to DEF3, can host becoming. The manifold of general relativity 
(empty spacetime), of course, cannot by itself host becoming, since we would also need the 
metric field, but then we should ask why, given the consequences of the hole argument, we 
should identify physical spacetime with the bare manifold.11 Finally, note that the “vacuum” 
of quantum field theory is certainly not devoid of “interesting events”.  
I hope this is sufficient to show that no matter how we interpret the relationship between 
events and spacetime – events are spacetime regions regarded as being capable of becoming, 
as in (a1), events exemplify spatio-temporal relations and are therefore distinct from 
spacetime regions, as in (a2), events are not spacetime regions and the latter don’t become, as 
in (a3) – we can accommodate becoming. 
(b) 
I must now show that DEF3 above is highly plausible, that is, that there is a strong, yet so 
far neglected, conceptual connection between the occurring and happening on the part of 
events on the one hand, and their becoming or coming into existence on the other (coming 
into being and becoming here are treated as synonymous).  
                                                 
11 For more arguments in this direction, see Dorato and Pauri (2006). 
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First of all, I take it to be uncontroversial that the being of an event just amounts to its 
happening, so that the meaning of the word event12 somehow contains in itself the germs for 
a reconciliation between a Parmenideian philosophy of being and an Heracliteian philosophy 
of passage, depending on whether we insist on the static-sounding “being located” or simply 
“being” of the event, or on its dynamical-sounding “occurring”. As in the case examined 
before concerning presentism and eternalism, we find good reasons to overcome a sterile, 
age-old opposition between the friends and the foes of becoming. On the one hand, eternalists 
and enemies of becoming will probably complain that there is no point in using in DEF3 the 
verbs “to occur” or “to happen”, since this makes becoming sound more dynamic than it is: 
the verb “to be” is what is required.13 On the other hand, since “being” and “occurring” for an 
event are one and the same thing, presentists and the friends of becoming will complain for 
the opposite reason. Once again, DEF3 irenically accommodates the best intuitions of both 
sides, showing at the same time that by accepting DEF3 the debate about absolute becoming 
in some sense dissolves. 
Despite etymology, what might still be controversial, of course, is the assumption that an 
event’s happening at a time-place is equivalent to its coming into being at that time-place, or 
simply to its becoming at that time-place. By focusing on temporal, rather than on simple 
absolute becoming, it is easy to build a simple argument that establishes the “only if” part of 
the equivalence, namely that temporal becoming logically or conceptually implies the 
happening of events. For those who regard this link as self-evident (as I do), the argument 
will still be helpful in pointing out the sense in which the view of becoming advocated here is 
committed to the age-old claim that time implies change.  
(1) The reality (mind-independence) of temporal becoming entails the reality (mind-
independence) of time;  
                                                 
12 “Event” comes from the Latin word eventus, the substativization of e(x)-venire, “to come from”. 
 13
(2) The mind-independence of time entails the mind-independence of change; 
(3) The mind-independence of change entails or is equivalent to the mind-independence of 
the occurring of events.  
Combining these three conditionals we have what we wanted, namely the fact that the 
notion of on objective temporal becoming entails an objective occurring of events. Of course, 
temporal becoming is a temporal notion and its reality requires the existence of time: I take it 
that (1) is uncontroversial. If time requires change (2), change requires events, because any 
change is an event, and events must occur by definition of the word event (3), where “occur”, 
“happen” and “take place” are primitive, non-analyzable verbs. Using the contrapositives of 
these conditionals, it is even easier to understand the chain of reasoning: if there were no 
occurring of events there would be no change; without change there would be no time, and 
without time there would be no becoming.  
The weak part of the above chain might be (2), due to the ambiguity of the notion of 
“change”. Define change1 as the possession of two incompatible properties by the same 
continuant at different times, as in “the traffic light became red”. Change as it is used in (2), 
call it change2, is not the qualitative change in time given by change1, but rather a coming 
into being, an occurring, a happening on the part of an event, as it is specified by (3).14 If time 
requires change1 then the argument would still go through, because changes in continuants 
(substances) are in any case events, and events occur. If time did not require change1, one 
could claim that it implies change2 , a position that possibly requires a relationist view of time 
or spacetime. While I cannot give further arguments for this claim here, I think that the view 
that the happening of events is essential to the reality of time is quite plausible and should be 
further explored. 
                                                                                                                                                        
13 This worry was expressed by one of the referees. 
14 For the difference between these two notions of change, see Broad (1938, p. 280) and Savitt (2002, p. 159). 
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In order to prove the “if part”, namely that the occurring of events is sufficient for 
absolute becoming, we must recall that the event’s being at some time place (t, s) is its 
occurring then and there, and conversely, an event e occurring at (t, s) is e’s being or existing 
at (t,s). This is sufficient for our derivation of the if-implication: take any future token event 
e; since the token event in question e has never occurred before, when it occurs it trivially 
comes into existence, or comes to pass by simply happening.  
This “proof” of “if-part” may seem too quick. Everyone agrees that there is a clear sense 
in which all events exist tenselessly at their respective spacetime locations. How can we 
claim that events do not simply tenselessly exist but in addition “come into being” at their 
location? Doesn’t tenseless existence (the block view) imply by itself that events tenselessly 
exist or are without coming into being?  
The reply to these objections is simple: the point of the DEF3 is simply to deflate the 
metaphysics of becoming and the metaphysics of being, by stressing that “coming into being” 
(becoming) and “being” or “existing” for events must be regarded as one and the same thing, 
and then insisting that an event cannot exist without happening (this is further developed in 
point (c) below). We are not adding anything to the essence of an event by saying that it 
comes into being or that it becomes, but we are simply saying that it takes place. As Broad 
already put it in his (1938), this absolute becoming is not to be understood analogously to 
acquisition of a property on the part of a “pre-existing” event.  
Here is another objection to the definition of becoming that I have provided. Part §1 has 
argued that the tenseless existence of an event e simply means that the event has existed, or 
exists now or will exist at some time-place. Suppose that event e is future so that, on the basis 
of DEF2, it is always true, and therefore true also at the present moment, that “e tenselessly 
exists”. One may wonder how can e come into being in the future when and where it will 
occur if also in the present moment it is true to say that e exists tenselessly. However, we 
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should not forget that the tenseless existence of e does not entail its present existence or its 
sempiternal existence: relative to its own spacetime location, e exists only there and then, 
because it is or takes place where it is located. In a word: e exists tenselessly because it will 
exist at some future time. But if it will exist and does not exist now, then we can say that it 
will come into being by occurring.15  
These objections depend on an equivocation about the nature of future events in the block 
universe, or in the eternalist’s perspective. We can represent events as “being all there”, as if 
all events had already happened, but we should not forget that this is only a representation, 
since the real, represented things are in time. Consequently, if the spacetime structure allows 
for some form of temporal becoming, the events occur one after the other; therefore, once we 
are given a temporal location, relative to that location, whether it is occupied by a sentient 
being or not, there is (tenselessly) and objectively a past and a future.  
In conclusion, relative to any point in space-time p, there are (tenselessly) events occurring 
before and events occurring after p. Since the existence of events is presupposed by the 
ontology of any classical spacetime theory, such an occurring must be regarded as a real, 
fundamental and non-analyzable feature of the universe. Finally, since temporal becoming is 
the successive occurrence of events, we will see that there is temporal becoming in any 
spacetime theory admitting timelike-separated events in its geometrical structure (see §3 
below). 
c) 
However, one could attempt to individuate a class of worlds to be contrasted with those 
that become as follows: call a physically possible world becomingless if and only if events in 
that world only appear to happen. That is, if becoming or the occurring of events were an 
                                                 
15 These replies meet some objections raised by a previous, anonymous reader of this paper. 
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illusion or a mind-dependent phenomenon, then we should say that events “simply are”, that 
really “they do not occur or happen”, but only appear to do so.  
Interestingly enough, two of the founding fathers of the theory of relativity have defended 
this view, claiming that relativity entails that the occurring of events is a “secondary quality” 
like color or tastes, due to the encounter of sentient beings with a timeless reality.16 The 
process of “secondarization” − which begun with the ancient atomists and which consist in 
putting in the mind properties that apparently belong to the external world − here would come 
to its radical completion. After the secondary qualities of Galilei, Boyle and Locke (colors, 
tastes, odors, sounds), after the “secondarization” of space advocated by George Berkeley, 
with Eddington and Weyl (and Gödel) we would arrive at claiming that relativity requires us 
to treat also time – in the form of the occurrence of events – as a purely “subjective” 
phenomenon: 
[In relativity], events do not happen; they are just there, and we come across them. “The formality 
of taking place” is merely the indication that the observer has on his voyage of exploration passed 
into the absolute future of the event in question (Eddington 1920, p. 51, emphasis added). 
 
The objective world simply is, it does not happen. Only to the gaze of my consciousness, crawling 
upward along the life-line of my body, does a section of this world come to life as a fleeting 
image in space which continuously changes in time (Weyl 1949, p. 116, emphasis added).  
 
I take it that in these frequently misunderstood passages, not only are Eddington and Weyl 
implicitly telling us what becoming is, but are also arguing against it: according to them, 
there could be no occurring of events without conscious or sentient beings, and there is an 
important distinction between the being of events and their happening, because the latter 
feature is a mind-dependent phenomenon. Certainly, if coordinate time is an identifying 
factor for the occurring of an event, as in Kim’s conception of events (1976), and coordinate 
time is frame-dependent, it would seem that the occurring of an event also becomes frame-
dependent and therefore relative, if not merely subjective. 
                                                 
16 Clearly, “timeless” does not mean “tenseless”. 
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Despite the authority of Eddington and Weyl, however, for the reasons given above I take 
it that a distinction between the being of an event and its occurring (due to our mind) is 
highly implausible. If we regard, as we should,“occurring” or “taking place” as primitives, or 
as not further analyzable verbs, it seems to me that the fact that events “occur”, “take place”, 
or “happen” is an undeniable part of the very meaning of the word “event”. Here is a 
quotation illustrating this view, and quite evidently addressed to the two quotations referred 
to above: «Taking place is not a formality to which an event incidentally submits – it is the 
event’s very being. World history consists of actual concrete happenings in a temporal 
sequence» (Williams 1951, p. 106, my emphasis).  
Notice that if we accept that the being of an event, its being located somewhere in 
spacetime, and its occurring, are one and the same thing, as Williams’ quotation above 
shows, then we have two remarkable consequences. The first is that even though there is a 
clearly defined contrast class to the DEF3 – the contrast would be between the reality of the 
happening of events and its mind-dependence or illusory nature – it is logically impossible 
that this class has elements, so that the distinction in question cannot apply to events. The 
second consequence follows from the first, and it is even more remarkable: the existence of 
absolute becoming in any spacetime theory must be admitted a priori. If “happening” is part 
of the meaning of “event”, i.e., if an event’s being just is its taking place and taking place is 
absolute becoming, then absolute becoming is a priori real in any spacetime theory, since 
such theories assume an ontology of real, mind-independent events.. 
This conclusion provides what I regard as a definitive argument in favor of the first and 
main claim of this paper: physics cannot provide empirical evidence for the reality of 
absolute becoming because it presupposes it, at least to the extent that it presupposes an 
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ontology of events.17 If events cannot but happen, and the happening of events is tantamount 
to their absolute becoming, physics is irrelevant to establish whether there is absolute 
becoming, since it must take it on board ab initio. This is true, of course, as soon as physics 
embarks, as it must, on the project of explaining and predicting things that “happen out there” 
And as we will see in section §3, if we replace coordinate time by proper time, the difficulty 
raised by Weyl and Eddington about the relativity of events’ times to frames, vanish 
altogether. 
d) 
I now have to face the question that seems the most complicated of the four: the view of 
becoming that I am advocating seems a far cry from the intuitive notion of the passage of 
time of our experience. Is the becoming that I am defending here, like Dennett’s free will in 
his (1984), “worth wanting”?  
I think that this criticism derives from two separate points that must be disentangled. The 
first, in particular, presupposes a supererogatory view of the task of the philosophy of time 
vis à vis the problem of becoming in physics. This first criticism seems to be based on the 
idea that a metaphysical interpretation of the ontology of spacetime physics must be capable 
of handling a psychological theory, so that until we have a metaphysical/physical theory that 
completely explains our psychological sense of the passage of time, we have not shown that, 
say, Minkowski spacetime is compatible with the becoming of our experience. The second 
point is the view that any form of becoming must presuppose a presentist conception of time 
in which the future is open, indeterminate unreal, and indefinite, in contrast to the closure, 
determinateness, reality and definiteness of the past. Since I hope to have disposed of the 
latter objection, I must deal with the former. 
                                                 
17 Notice that this claim does not depend on any dubious argument about the difficult epistemological problem 
concerning when and how does a physical theory provides evidence for ontological claims. 
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I take it that the main aim of the discussions concerning the definability of becoming in 
Minkowski spacetime was to show that, given a suitable definition of becoming – which, I 
submit, until very recently was lacking – a physical theory like the special theory of relativity 
does not contradict our temporal experience, in which becoming clearly plays an essential 
role. An immediate consequence of a compatibility result would be, of course, that we could 
in principle model our psychological experience of time in a spacetime arena like the one of 
special relativity. Absence of compatibility between the time of our experience and the time 
of physics would instead create trouble for physicalism in general, given that the 
compatibility of two theories is a necessary condition to reduce one to the other, or at least to 
have some sort of supervenience of one on the other.18  
Therefore, I take it that the main task of the philosophical literature on time that we are 
critically evaluating is to show that it is in principle possible to find a plausible metaphysical 
“counterpart”, or a supervenience basis, of our psychological sense of passage and then to 
show that this counterpart is compatible with spacetime physics. At the current stage of our 
neuro-psychological inquiry, however, we cannot explain a phenomenological theory of our 
internal consciousness of time with a physical theory of time 
In some sense then, the accusation that DEF3 above cannot do justice to our experience is 
unfair. Clearly, the explication of becoming given above cannot do justice to the richness of 
our experience of time, which can only be arrived at by psychological or phenomenological 
descriptions. Since we don’t possess a physicalist theory of our conscious experience of time, 
and since it is possible that such theory could not be achieved in principle, we should be 
content to evaluate whether DEF3 or some other similar proposals can constitute the 
supervenience base on which physiological and psychological laws and predicates could 
depend. And it seems to me that, from this viewpoint, the experience of the passage of time 
                                                 
18 This fact has been curiously neglected by many philosophers of mind.  
 20
must have as a physical/metaphysical counterpart at least a succession of events mind-
independently occurring one after the other. This is to be regarded as the 
physical/metaphysical necessary condition upon which our capacity of experiencing present 
event, retaining past experiences and anticipating future events, is grounded. Unless we are 
constantly deluded by our experience, we could not have any experience of time without this 
objective fact of the world, and this statement poses an essential constraint to the possibility 
of a physical theory that denies the reality of time: such a theory should in any case recover 
as an approximation the regime of classical theories of spacetime, in which change is real 
because events happen in a real succession! 
In a word, we cannot ask to an explication of becoming that tries to solve the problem of 
the compatibility of the time of our experience with the time of physics to reproduce all the 
details of our psychological experience of time. Admittedly, though, there is one essential 
feature of our experience of passage that needs to be further discussed, namely the 
directionality of time, which, however, we can capture only by going to relational becoming. 
  
§3 Relational becoming and the arrow of time 
 
Distinguishing between absolute and relational becoming has the aim of establishing 
whether, given a particular event or a class of events, it is possible to consider some events as 
having become with respect to it, and some that haven’t. While the coming into being of an 
event e involves only the occurrence of e, and is in this sense intrinsic, absolute and real in 
any spacetime theory assuming an ontology of events, we must now look into the 
consequences of regarding becoming as a relation between events: xBy =def “y has become as 
of x”. While absolute becoming is not sufficient to establish the directionality of becoming, 
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we will see how relational becoming establishes a rather unexplored connection with the 
issues surrounding the so-called question of the arrow of time. 
The spacetime I shall be considering in this paper is Minkowski’s, and the reasons for this 
restriction are two-fold: 1) all field theories (except gravitational ones) can be written by 
considering Minkowski spacetime as the arena in which events and processes occur;19 2) as 
we are about to see, the definability of a becoming relation in Minkowski spacetime has been 
proved rigorously and it is important to base our inquiry on solid results.  
In virtue of its meaning, a relation of becoming B holding between pairs of physical events 
must be regarded as reflexive; in addition, if we want objective, i.e. invariant 
(intersubjectively valid) descriptions of the word, we must also require that B be transitive for 
observers intersecting at a point (or at a sufficiently small region of spacetime). In order to 
establish a compatibility result, following Stein (1991) and Clifton and Hogarth (1995), we 
need three more hypotheses: 
(i) B is non-universal: this means that for all events x of spacetime, there are events y 
such that –xBy, which means, in its turn, that for all events x of Minkowski spacetime, 
there are other events y that have not become with respect to x. As we will see, it is 
important to keep in mind that this hypothesis is in fact equivalent to assuming 
becoming; 
(ii) for some pair of events such that y is in the causal past of x, , then it is also the 
case that xBy, i.e., with obvious symbolism, ;  
yxKP
xByyxKP →
(iii) B is invariant under all automorphisms preserving a temporal orientation of 
Minkowski spacetime, ensuring that if we parallel transport any timelike vector 
                                                 
19 It is controversial whether the introduction of a cosmic time function in general-relativistic models suffices to 
construe becoming as more than a purely “local” notion, in the sense of “local” that will become clear in the 
following. For arguments in favor of the “locality” of becoming even in cosmology, I refer the reader to Dieks’s 
paper in this issue.  
 22
pointing in the future while keeping it timelike, it will remain future-pointing 
everywhere in spacetime. 
If the relation of becoming B satisfies reflexivity, transitivity and the three premises above, 
then one can prove that B is co-extensive with the relation of past causal connectibility (KP): 
for all x and y, xKPy iff xBy. As the knowledgeable reader will have noticed, except for the 
replacement of Stein’s unclear and misleading relation of “ontological definiteness” with a 
relation of temporal becoming that is devoid of any ontologically asymmetric assumptions – 
as mandated by the first part of this paper – this is essentially the result of Stein’s theorem, 
which has three interesting consequences. 
1) If we accept Stein’s hypotheses, in Minkowski spacetime spatial becoming (i.e., becoming 
relating only spacelike-separated events) is absent, so that an invariant temporal becoming is 
strictly local: the physical present of an event is just the event itself. In the special theory of 
relativity, as announced above, temporal becoming is either frame-dependent, global and 
therefore non-invariant or else, if invariant, as it should be in order to be objective, simply 
incompatible with spatial becoming..  
2) As a consequence, our “natural” belief in the spatial extendedness of the present (spatial 
becoming) is strictly speaking wrong, and the special theory, together with few 
psychophysical findings, can explain the origin of our “mistake”. To use an expression of 
Minkowski’s, “space by itself” (1908), regarded as the order of coexistence, is a shared 
construction of our brains, due to the existence of a finite threshold for discriminating two 
light-signals as temporally successive on the one hand, and the relatively “amazing” speed of 
light on the other. Given a threshold of approximately 15 ms – below which we cannot tell 
apart two light signals presented in front of us in a screen – light can travel 4500 km. Call the 
first of the two signals A and the second B, and imagine that A is emitted on the surface of a 
sphere whose radius is 4500 km, while B is emitted where we are, in the center of the sphere, 
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just 15 ms after A. Because of the perceptive threshold of 15 ms, for us A and B are 
simultaneous and every light signal C that is emitted after A but before B will be perceived 
simultaneously with A and B. If we want to represent our psychological present along our 
four dimensional worldline, we must consider that we are “temporally long and therefore 
large” and “spatially thin” (as Stein more or less put it) 
3) In virtue of §1, we must conclude that for any event e of Minkowski spacetime, any 
future or spacelike-related event tenselessly coexist with e, despite the fact that, if there is 
temporal becoming, all such events relative to e have not become. In fact, if there is 
becoming, Stein’s result tells us that, relative to any event e of Minkowski spacetime, only 
events in the past light-cone of e have become, and becoming is strictly local. Clifton and 
Hogarth (1995) have strengthened Stein’s result to chronological becoming, namely 
becoming along worldlines. In both theorems, however, we should note a consequence of 
extreme importance, that so far has been completely neglected: temporal becoming involves 
the issue of an asymmetric causal or temporal relation, and therefore the complex question of 
direction (arrow) of time, but has nothing to do with allegedly ontic asymmetries between 
past present and future. This is the second, main result of my paper. 
It is interesting to ask ourselves why this simple consequence has so far escaped us. The 
reply is immediate if we consider Grünbaum’s (1973) argument for the conceptual separation 
between the issue of becoming and that of the arrow or direction of time. For Grünbaum, 
becoming or the flow of time involves the reality of tenses and the “moving now” conception 
of time, a thesis that, in fact, is conceptually independent of the structural difference that 
irreversible phenomena impose on the two directions of time. Structural difference, or as 
Grünbaum puts it, anisotropy, means that in one such direction we find the entropy of most 
closed systems going up, radiation waves diverging from a center, kaons decaying in a certain 
way, and galaxies receding from one other, while in the other direction of time (the one we 
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call from later to earlier) entropy mostly goes down, waves converge and the universe 
(supposing it will expand forever in what we call the past-future direction) will re-collapse to 
the big bang. If nowness were mind-dependent, and becoming involved a moving now, as 
Grünbaum has it, we could have an arrow of time (a structural distinctions between the two 
directions guaranteed by physics) and yet no mind-independent becoming at all. 
This claim is correct as long as we hold for true the wrongheaded theory of becoming 
espoused by Grünbaum: becoming as I see it does not involve the question of the reality of 
tenses. In order to evaluate Grünbaum’s objection to the conceptual connection between 
becoming and the arrow of time, I must take a stand on the question of the nature of the 
present and its alleged “flow”. What I have written so far has completely ignored these 
difficult problems and with good reasons: the question whether the presentness of an event is 
an objective, mind-independent feature of the event itself – or is rather to be regarded as an 
indexical like “here”, “I” and “she”, expressing the temporal position of the speaker relative 
to the event – is completely irrelevant for understanding the issue of the ontological status of 
the future or the past vis à vis the present. The fact that an event E is present may well be an 
objective mind-independent fact, and yet future and past events (relative to E) are to be 
regarded as existing in the tenseless sense required by DEF2, namely as being capable of 
future or past occurrence. The advantage of recognizing both a tensed and a tenseless sense of 
existence is that we can leave on a side the question of the nature of the present or the reality 
of tenses. In my view, being present for an event just means for it to occur, to exist, from its 
own temporal “perspective”; if an observer happens to be situated where the events occur, her 
calling it “present” is another way of affirming the fact that the event is occurring 
simultaneously to her perceiving it. I don’t think that treating “being present” as an indexical 
as I do makes the fact that an event is occurring at a certain spatiotemporal location less 
objective.  
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As I take it, the question of the motion of the present, its flow, is the question whether it is 
an objective fact that events occur in succession along one or the other of the two directions 
of time. To be vivid, call one end of the universe Α and the other B, without prejudging 
which is the beginning and which the end: if there temporal becoming in one direction rather 
than the other, it means that the order of succession of events is from A to B rather than from 
B to A, so that A is the beginning and B the end. In other words yet, this also entails that the 
relation “earlier than” is objective, or independent of sentient beings, because while the 
earlier event has occurred from the perspective of the later, the later one objectively hasn’t, 
and this is what the directionality of becoming amounts to.20 In a word, if the issue of the 
direction of time is not to be construed as entailing that “the past is real, the future isn’t”, or 
as the definability of an asymmetric relation of becoming in terms of the past causal 
connectibility relation, the coextensionality of the two relations, renders Grünbaum’s 
objections against a conceptual separation between becoming and an arrow of time irrelevant.  
From Stein’s theorem we learn that the issue of becoming in Minkowski spacetime makes 
us land in the territory of the arrow of causation, possibly connected to other metaphysical 
and physical “arrows” that mark out our experience of the unidirectionality of time. While 
absolute becoming is a priori and trivially true in any spacetime theory adopting an ontology 
of events, relational becoming, if it is a property of our universe, seems to be entitled to avoid 
the muddy banks populated by the metaphysical discussions of presentists vs. eternalist and 





                                                 





However, one could still wonder whether physics is really relevant for establishing the 
reality of relational becoming. After all, Stein, Clifton and Hogarth were able to prove their 
compatibility result only by assuming that there is becoming, which amounts to the claim that 
the relation B is not universal (see (i) above). This does not amount, of course, to charging 
their compatibility result with circularity (if you are interested in establishing a compatibility 
result then you must assume becoming), but might seem to reinforce the main point of this 
paper, which is that classical spacetime physics cannot provide empirical evidence for the 
reality (mind-independence) of becoming, because it requires both absolute and relational 
becoming as a priori postulations. After all, the definition of relational becoming 
presupposes the notion of absolute becoming, which, as we have seen, is in its turn 
presupposed a priori in any theory assuming an ontology of events.  
In order to explore the epistemic status of relational becoming vis à vis classical spacetime 
physics, there are three options that need to be briefly mentioned. Either (a) the asymmetry of 
causation is more fundamental than the asymmetry of becoming, or (b) the reverse is the 
case, or (c) both “arrows” depend on some more fundamental physical or experiential 
“arrow”. Even though a detailed discussion of these three options here is impossible, in order 
to argue that classical spacetime physics presupposes also relational becoming it might be 
sufficient to discuss the relationship between the arrow of causation and the arrow of 
becoming and show that the latter is more fundamental than the former. 
In fact, if we reflect on Stein’s premise (ii) above, the arrow of becoming is construed as a 
necessary condition for the possibility that event a causally influences b, whenever a is in the 
                                                                                                                                                        
than he does about justifying a literal flow of the present. 
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causal past of b. If we assume that influence on any event b in Minkowski spacetime can only 
(or typically) come from an event a in the causal past of b, then we must also hold that a has 
become as of b. In this hypothesis, since is the temporal succession of events (the order of 
becoming) that confers an asymmetric order to causation, it is more fundamental than the 
causal arrow. Epistemically this hypothesis seems highly plausible, since if we did not know 
that a process is already temporally directed from a to b, we could not claim that b is the 
backward cause of a (where “backward” means of course that b is later than a).21 In order to 
distinguish forward from backward causation we must regard the temporal order as 
something that is given independently of the asymmetry of the causal relationship. And the 
same is true from an ontological point of view: if a process were not already temporally 
directed from a to b, b could not be the “backward” cause of a.  
If we grant the asymmetry of becoming center stage and leave the asymmetry of causation 
in the background, understanding whether physics presupposes also the order of becoming 
looks a much easier task.  In fact, it is not at all clear how physics could explain or ground the 
fact that in the universe there is a successive coming into being of events, since such a 
succession is necessarily assumed to make sense of any problem concerning the existence of 
irreversible physical processes. Certainly, physics could provide evidence as to the reason 
why we observe that a local (STR) or possibly global (GTR) succession of events is directed 
from A to B rather than the other way round.22 That is, physics can tell us whether we can 
associate or correlate some irreversible physical process or law with the order of becoming 
(say the growth of entropy in one of the two directions, or the expansion of the universe, or 
the decay of kaons in the weak interactions). But it should be clear that talking about the 
asymmetry of certain physical processes in time presupposes the reality of a successive 
coming into being of physical events, i.e., the reality of temporal becoming. In this respect, 
                                                 
21 I owe this argument to one of the referees. 
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the deep reason why the search for a master asymmetry in physics presupposes the order of 
becoming is given by the fact that in order to have real time, we must have a successive 
coming into being of events in one of its two directions.23  
By looking at some formulations of quantum gravity, one could argue that even though 
physics cannot ground or explain the arrow of becoming, it could certainly falsify the claim 
that, at the most fundamental level, there is a temporal succession of happenings. Despite the 
lack of any empirical evidence concerning quantum theories of gravity, we should be open to 
this theoretical possibility. However, even granting it does nothing to jeopardize the 
conclusions we have reached so far: since any theory of quantum gravity should be able to 
recover classical spacetime theory at a certain level of description, in no way could we 
conclude that temporal becoming is an illusion: all physical theories we know so far 
presuppose (in the sense we have seen) that there is an unfolding of events in time (local, or 
global as it might be in cosmology) and even a no-change theory will have to take this fact 
into account. After all, when thermodynamics was explained by a deeper, time-symmetric 
theory (statistical mechanics), the irreversibility of thermal phenomena did not certainly go 
away.24
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